Account recovery does not leak user information

Predictable recovery tokens (generated with Math.random, timestamps, or sequential IDs) can be brute-forced or guessed, giving attackers account recovery capability without the victim's involvement. CWE-640 (Weak Password Recovery) and CWE-338 (Use of Cryptographically Weak PRNG) both apply. Disclosing account email or username on the reset confirmation page before the token is validated reveals account existence and PII to anyone with a guess-and-click workflow. OWASP A07 covers both weak token generation and information disclosure during recovery as authentication failures.

Use crypto.randomBytes for all recovery tokens — this is the only acceptable random source for security-sensitive values:

// Correct: 256 bits of cryptographic randomness
const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')

// Wrong — do not use either of these:
const token = Date.now().toString()           // Predictable
const token = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2) // Not cryptographically secure

On the reset confirmation page, show only a generic 'Enter your new password' form — do not display the account email, name, or any other identifying information before the token is validated and the new password is submitted. Confirm success with a generic message, then redirect to login.